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THE OBSTACLE: A PROPOSAL FOR A UNIVERSAL
STANDARD TO DETERMINE THOSE ACTS OR
EVENTS THAT SUFFICIENTLY RISE TO THE LEVEL
OF AN OBSTACLE SUSPENDING PRESCRIPTION
OF NON-USE FOR A MINERAL SERVITUDE OWNER
UNDER LOUISIANA MINERAL CODE ARTICLE 59
ERIC R. HARPER
Introduction
Like all great Louisiana tales, this one begins with our friends,
Boudreaux & Thibodeaux.1 Boudreaux purchased Blackacre from
Thibodeaux on January 1, 2009. Thibodeaux expressly reserved the right to
explore for oil & gas by a mineral servitude within the Act of Sale.
Unfortunately, Thibodeaux is quite lazy, preferring to do anything but
explore the land for minerals. Thibodeaux continued to ignore his mineral
right on Blackacre for nearly the next 10 years. It is only on December 26,
2018, that Thibodeaux receives news that a nearby land, Whiteacre, has
started producing paying quantities of oil. His wife, Clotile, informed him
 LL.M Candidate 2021, London School of Economics and Political Science; J.D.
2020, Paul M. Hebert Law Center. The author would like to thank his parents, brother and
partner—Tom, Mary, Thomas and Kira—for their unconditional love and support. They are
truly the pistons driving this engine. The author would also like to thank Professors Keith
Hall and Edward Richards for their insights and assistance while researching and writing this
Comment.
1. Boudreaux and Thibodeaux are two characters from South Louisiana experiencing
life's trials and tribulations. It is common in South Louisiana to see these characters arise in
oral stories passed down from one generation to another and the author has benefitted from
the humorous life events presiding within these fables.
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that they have bills to pay, so Thibodeaux decided to begin the process of
drilling on his land. On December 29, 2018, Thibodeaux’s hired contractor
began drilling operations, but the equipment failed and the operations could
not proceed. Later that evening, a massive storm swept over the area
containing Blackacre, causing unforeseeable inundation of the land.
Consequently, all equipment and personnel had to be evacuated and no
successful drilling occurred. On January 2, 2019, the residual water finally
drained from the land, and drilling activities commenced. On January 3,
2019, drilling was conducted to the depth where paying quantities are
located. Thibodeaux became a millionaire overnight . . . or did he?
Meanwhile, Boudreaux claimed that Thibodeaux improperly trespassed
upon Blackacre because the right to the minerals had reverted to Boudreaux
on January 1, 2019. Thibodeaux contested Boudreaux’s claim, arguing that
the flooding constituted an obstacle that suspended the tolling of
prescription of nonuse, and correspondingly, he was within his rights to
explore the minerals on Blackacre.
Louisiana courts have discussed the law regarding obstacles in several
cases but failed to give a precise standard to define an obstacle—rather, the
jurisprudence has defined what is not an obstacle, as opposed to what is. 2
Most of the cases involve mere legal restrictions, as opposed to physical
restrictions that would materially obstruct an individual or entity from the
use of a mineral servitude. In recent years, flooding concerns have vastly
increased, notably the 2016 Baton Rouge Flood and the 2017 Hurricane
Harvey flooding in Houston. Considering these growing concerns, it is now
increasingly important to discuss and determine whether a catastrophic
flood, causing inundation of prescriptable land, can establish a sufficient
obstacle to use of the servitude such that the running of prescription of
nonuse warrants suspension.
Part I will lay a background of the law regarding mineral servitudes in
Louisiana, including a discussion of the provisions for prescription of
nonuse, as well as the legal mechanisms that stop the tolling of
prescription.3 Part II will provide an examination of the Louisiana
jurisprudence discussing the suspension of prescription as a result of an
obstacle. 4 Part III will propose a universal standard to assist mineral
servitude owners in exploring the question of whether particular acts or
events are sufficient to rise to the level of an obstacle suspending
2. See Comment to La. R.S § 31:59.
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
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prescription of nonuse. 5 Finally, Part IV will propose that under the
standard elucidated, extensive flooding is an obstacle under Louisiana
Mineral Code Article 59 (hereinafter “Article 59”)—and illustrate the
proposal through the hypothetical introduced at the inception of this
Comment.6
I. Background
The prominent Roman glossator Accursius once proclaimed cuius est
solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, “usually translated as
meaning that the rights of the surface owner extend upward to the heavens
(ad coelum) and downward to the center of the earth (ad inferos)."7
However, modifying the traditional ad coelum doctrine, Louisiana mineral
law expressly restricts a person from owning “oil, gas and other minerals
occurring naturally in liquid or gaseous form . . . .”8 While Louisiana
maintained the ownership-in-place theory for solid minerals, it established
the non-ownership or servitude theory over fugacious minerals. True
ownership of fugitive minerals, such as oil and gas, only occurs once the
minerals are reduced to possession. 9 In the seminal case of Frost-Johnson
Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, the Louisiana Supreme Court handed down
a decision viewed by many as “the single most important decision ever
rendered by the Louisiana Supreme Court in the area of mineral law,” 10
holding that fugacious minerals were insusceptible of ownership before
being reduced to possession. Instead, a transfer of the “ownership” of
fugitive minerals from the landowner to another was a transfer of the right
to explore and reduce to possession—a servitude.11 This landmark decision
was codified in the Louisiana Mineral Code and remains the bedrock of the
law governing minerals.12
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part V.
7. John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979, 980–
81 (2008); Id. at note 14 (“ [Edward] Coke [in The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of
England] apparently borrowed this phrase from civil law scholars, where it can be traced
back to Accursius, a glossator whose commentaries on Roman law were written in the
thirteenth century.”).
8. La. R.S. 31:6 (2000).
9. Id.
10. Patrick S. Ottinger, A Primer on the Mineral Servitude, 47th Ann. Inst. on Min. L.
68 (1997).
11. See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co v. Salling’s Heirs, 150 La. 756, 863 (La. 1920).
12. Id.
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Louisiana differs from other states in that it “does not recognize a
separate mineral estate in oil and gas.”13 This rule was first dictated by the
Louisiana Supreme Court and subsequently codified in the Louisiana
Mineral Code. 14 The Louisiana Mineral Code defines a mineral servitude as
a right “belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and producing
minerals and reducing them to possession and ownership.”15 This paper will
not set forth an exhaustive discussion of Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, as
notable scholars have previously done.16
The mineral servitude comes with significant legal consequences if
unused. Most notably, a mineral servitude is extinguished by nonuse if it is
not used for a period of ten years.17 Unlike a mineral servitude, a common
law mineral estate will generally not escheat to the landowner if not used
within a certain time, absent an intent to abandon or the enactment of a
state-specific Dormant Mineral Act.18 Whether a mineral servitude has
prescribed by nonuse is a major area of litigation under Louisiana mineral
rights.19 The law provides certain relief to the running of prescription of
nonuse on a mineral servitude: suspension and interruption.20

13. In the vast majority of common law states, there has been limited abrogation of ad
coelum doctrine, so that the owner of the land retains the ownership of the minerals within
the land and is capable of creating a separate mineral estate that is an independent article of
commerce; see Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV.
1097, 1098 (1987).
14. See Frost-Johnson Lumber Co, 150 La. at 863 (La. 1920); see also La. R.S. 31:21
(2000).
15. La. R.S. 31:21 (2000).
16. See generally Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L.
REV. 1097 (1987); see also Patrick S. Ottinger, A Primer on the Mineral Servitude, 47th
Ann. Inst. on Min. L. 68 (1997).
17. La. Civ. Code arts. 789, 3546; see e.g., Frost-Johnson Lumber Company, 150 La. at
864.
18. For an illustration of a common law state terminating a separate mineral estate under
the doctrine of abandonment, see e.g., Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 876-877 (1968);
For an example of an enacted Dormant Mineral Act, see e.g., Ohio Dormant Mineral Act,
Ohio Rev. Code § 5301.56(B)(1)(c) and (B)(2) (1989).
19. Patrick H. Martin, Mineral Rights, 43 LA. L. REV. 523, 531 (1982).
20. See La. R.S. 31:29 (2000) (“The prescription of nonuse running against a mineral
servitude is interrupted by good faith operations for the discovery and production of
minerals. By good faith is meant that the operations must be (1) commenced with reasonable
expectation of discovering and producing minerals in paying quantities at a particular point
or depth, (2) continued at the site chosen to that point or depth, and (3) conducted in such a
manner that they constitute a single operation although actual drilling or mining is not
conducted at all times.”); see also La. R.S. 31:59 (“If the owner of a mineral servitude is
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Generally speaking, the Louisiana Civil Code states that “if the owner of
the dominant estate is prevented from using the servitude by an obstacle
that he can neither prevent nor remove, the prescription of nonuse is
suspended on that account for a period of up to ten years.”21 Feeding off of
the Civil Code provision, the Louisiana Mineral Code specifically deals
with mineral servitudes, providing that prescription of nonuse is suspended
when there is an obstacle that prevents the owner of a mineral servitude
from use. 22 The problem with the statutory provisions and the jurisprudence
is that while these sources give us the rule for suspension of prescription of
nonuse resulting from an obstacle preventing the use of the mineral
servitude, they fail to provide useful concrete standards to determine acts or
events that are potentially an obstacle. 23
An “obstacle,” defined in laymen’s terms, is “something that impedes
progress or achievement.”24 To impede, an act or event must “interfere with
or slow the progress of” the object at issue. 25 Thus, an obstacle, put plainly,
is something that interferes with or slows the progress of the mineral
servitude owner from using his or her servitude. 26 The authors of the
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise for Predial Servitudes state that “[a]n obstacle
may be legal, such as an injunction, or it may be material, such as a
temporary inundation of the servient estate.” 27 Besides that, not much
guidance exists on this seemingly trivial concept that can have far-reaching
ramifications.

prevented from using it by an obstacle that he can neither prevent nor remove, the
prescription of nonuse does not run as long as the obstacle remains.”).
21. La. Civ. Code art. 755 (2010).
22. La. R.S. 31:59 (2000).
23. Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1097,
1159 (1987).
24. Obstacle, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/obstacle (last visited Dec. 11, 2019).
25. Impede, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/impede (last visited Dec. 11, 2019).
26. See Obstacle, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/obstacle (last visited Dec. 11, 2019); See also Impede,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/impede (last visited Dec. 11, 2019); La. R.S. 31:59 (2000).
27. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 8:6, in 4 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE (West 4th ed. 2004).
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II. Louisiana Jurisprudence on Obstacles
The courts have interpreted this simple provision in the Louisiana
Mineral Code, addressing man made obstacles 28 and legal obstacles 29, but
there are no published opinions discussing an obstacle created resulting
from action by neither man nor the State. Natural acts, such as flooding and
hurricanes, have not been examined as an obstacle preventing the exercise
of a mineral servitude right. Courts have addressed such an obstacle in nonbinding dicta, providing support for the argument that either the courts or
the legislature should expressly provide that natural disasters preventing the
use of a mineral servitude should fall under the umbrella of an “obstacle”
for purposes of suspending prescription of nonuse. 30
A. Under Louisiana Law, a Landowner’s Grant of a Future Right to Use
the Land does not Impair a Mineral Servitude Owner from Using the Land
in the Present
In Gayoso Co. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., the Louisiana Supreme
Court held that the landowner’s grant of a future mineral lease that was to
take effect after the expiration of the outstanding mineral servitude did not
suspend prescription because it was not an obstacle to the use of the right to
explore the land for minerals.31 The Court noted that nothing stopped the
mineral servitude holder from exercising his right to explore the land. 32
Furthermore, the Court opined that if the landowner had resisted his act to
enter the land and exploit the resources, then this “might be said that the
resistance constituted an obstacle, placed in the way of using the servitude,
with the resultant effect of suspending prescription, until removed.” 33
B. Louisiana Courts Have Consistently Held That No Obstacle Occurs
Where the Mineral Servitude Owner Has a Right to Explore the Land but
Did Not Exercise It Because Of a Controversy in Court.
Two decades after Gayoso, the Louisiana Supreme Court was tasked
with addressing another ten years nonuse claim and the accompanying
defense that the running of prescription was suspended due to an obstacle
restricting the exercise of the servitude. 34 The Court found that a lawsuit
28. See e.g., Hall v. Dixon 401 So.2d 473 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
29. See e.g., Gayoso Co. v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 176 La. 333 (1933); see also
Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 227 La. 1044 (La. 1955).
30. See e.g., Hall v. Dixon, 401 So.2d 473, 476-77 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
31. Gayoso, 176 La. at 333, 340.
32. Id. at 341.
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 227 La. 1044, 1049 (La. 1955).
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over ownership of the mineral rights was not a sufficient obstacle to
suspend prescription because at no time was the mineral servitude owner
denied entry onto the land, and the mineral servitude owner actually had
free access to the land for exploration purposes. 35
The holding in Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co. reinforces the
principle that if the mineral servitude owner has legal access to the land and
is permitted and capable of exploring the land, then no obstacle is present
even though there is pending questions over the ownership over these
rights. However, the disputed mineral servitude owner whom is currently
exercising its perceived right to explore will be permitted to use the land,
but damages may result for trespass should the court determine that the
party is not the lawful owner of the right to explore.
C. A Government Order That Restricts the Right of Mineral Servitude
Owner from Exercising His Right to Explore for Minerals, While Seemingly
an Obstacle, Has Been Legislatively Declared to Not Suspend Prescription
of Nonuse
In Boddie v. Drewett, defendants alleged that their mineral servitude was
not subject to prescription for nonuse because there was a compulsory
unitization order 36 from the Commissioner of Conservation that prohibited
them from drilling on said land. 37 It was argued that the government’s
restriction on the mineral servitude owner’s ability to act was an obstacle
that should suspend prescription from running. The Louisiana Supreme
Court noted that the jurisprudence in mineral servitude cases typically leads
to the conclusion that an obstacle was not in existence but “when the facts
exhibit a real obstacle to the use of the servitude, such as the lawful orders
of the Commissioner of Conservation, the Codal provision applies and the
running of prescription is suspended by operation of law.”38 Accordingly,
the court found that the order by the Commission of Conservation was an
effective obstacle to the use of the mineral servitude because it effectively
prohibited any drilling operations on the 12-acre tract.39 However, this
35. Id. at 1056.
36. A compulsory unitization order is a formal exercise “of the state police power to
compel owners of mineral interests, working interests and royalty interests to consolidate
their separately owned estates over all, or a portion of, a common source of supply.” See
Bruce M. Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization with an Emphasis on the Statutory
and Common Law of the Eastern United States, 27 Energy & Min. L. Inst. Ch. 7 (2007).
37. 229 La. 1017, 1020 (1956).
38. Id. at 1024.
39. Id. at 1025.
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decision was overruled by the Louisiana Supreme Court nearly a decade
later, and the Mire decision is retained under Article 61, which provides
that a compulsory unitization order is not an obstacle for purposes of
suspending prescription.40
D. A Physical Act by The Surface Owner, Which Prevents the Owner of the
Mineral Rights from Exercising His Right to Explore the Land and Cannot
Be Removed by Lawful Means, is an Obstacle Suspending the Running of
Prescription of Nonuse
The Louisiana Second Circuit for the Court of Appeal faced a
controversy involving a physical restriction that was an alleged obstacle in
the way of use of a mineral servitude. 41 In Hall, a property owner who
claimed partial ownership of the land subject to Plaintiff’s mineral
servitude, engaged in several acts that caused the court to determine if the
prescription was suspended. 42 He pulled up the stake marking the site of the
proposed well, locked the gate which controlled access to the proposed well
site, and refused to permit the mineral servitude holder’s contractor to enter
the land to do work preparatory to the drilling. 43 The court concluded that
the obstructions could not have been removed by any legal way other than
by the suit which they instituted, holding that the property owner had
effectively created an obstacle to the use of plaintiffs’ servitudes. 44 The
court further noted “that an obstacle may exist wholly apart from the
actions of the surface owners.45 A notable scholar has briefly discussed that
this could lead to a reasonable inference that flooding would constitute an
obstacle to the exercise of a servitude. 46
Likewise, in Corley v. Craft, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant, by overt
act, created an obstacle within the meaning of Article 59.47 The plaintiffs
were Mrs. Corley and Twin City Gas Company, the mineral servitude
owner-lessor and mineral lessee, respectively. 48 Plaintiffs sought to explore
land under their contractual rights reserved in a sale to Defendant, but their
40. Mire v. Hawkins, 249 La. 278 (1966); La. R.S. 31:61 (2000).
41. Hall v. Dixon, 401 So.2d 473 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
42. Id. at 475.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 476.
45. Id. at 476-477; Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L.
REV. 1097, 1163 (1987).
46. Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1097,
1163 (1987).
47. 501 So.2d 1049, 1050 (La. 1987).
48. Id.
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efforts were hindered by Defendant’s acts.49 Notably, Defendant “dug out”
the access road upon notice that drilling operations were to begin and
refused Plaintiff’s offer to pay for road reconstruction. 50 Defendant then
contacted the party contracted to construct the new road and requested that
he not assist Plaintiff, and then blocked access to the new access road with
a sizeable bulldozer and backhoe. 51
Upon arriving at the blocked access road, Defendant refused to remove
the obstruction, claiming that the plaintiffs needed to get a permit from the
Commissioner for Conservation for the State of Louisiana. Plaintiffs agreed
to the terms, flew down to the Commissioner’s office in Baton Rouge, and
obtained a drilling permit. However, to their shock and horror, the access
road remained blocked, and Defendant’s lawyer delivered a letter disclosing
“that access was being denied because operations at the permitted location
might be in violation of the laws of Louisiana
and the regulations of the Department of Environmental Quality.” 52
Defendant then called DEQ directly to inform them he had been dumping
his trash on the property, and thereupon DEQ issued an injunctive order
against Plaintiff.53 In response, Plaintiff left the property, and Defendant
subsequently removed its heavy equipment blocking the access road. 54
The acts of Defendant amounted to a “wild goose chase” and were
designed to delay the exploration of the land with the hope that the
underlying mineral servitude would terminate as a result of prescription of
nonuse and would, as a result, revert to the defendant-landowner.
Ultimately, the court determined that the continuous chain of events that
prevented the plaintiff from exploring the land was within the meaning of
an obstacle under Article 59.55 In doing so, the court found that defendant
effectively established an obstacle to the use of the land by refusing to grant
a pipeline right-of-way, removing the only access road to the property,
blocking the entranceway to the drilling rig, requiring that the plaintiffs fly
to Baton Rouge to obtain a newly signed drilling permit, and reporting his
actions to the Department of Environmental Quality to obtain an injunction
on drilling on the land. 56 Furthermore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1052.
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“could not have removed or prevented this continuous series of obstacles
created by the cutting of the only access, the blockage by the heavy
machinery, and the attainment of the injunction order.”57
III. Proposed Universal Standard for Determining Obstacles Within the
Parameters of Article 59
To clarify the question regarding what is an obstacle under the
parameters of Article 59, broad, but certain standards must be enacted to
assist persons in understanding what constitutes an obstacle under the law.
A standard is proposed to determine whether a particular claim is sufficient
to rise to the level of an obstacle and, thus, suspends the tolling of
prescription of nonuse under Article 59.
The four-prong test proceeds as follows:
(1) Do(es) the mineral servitude owner(s) have a right to explore
the land?
(2) If yes, was the mineral servitude owner, or a person
authorized to act on his behalf, by physical act, impermissibly
restricted access to the land and his right to explore the land, or
did an obstacle exist wholly apart from the actions of another
person?
(3) If yes, could the mineral servitude owner(s) reasonably
resolve the obstruction?
(4) If no, then an obstacle to the exercise of the mineral servitude
existed and the tolling of prescription of nonuse is suspended
until the obstacle can be removed from the land.
A. The Party Seeking to Suspend the Tolling of Prescription of Nonuse Must
Have a Legal Right to Explore the Land
Article 59 establishes an initial threshold that a claimant must surpass
before considering whether a particular act or event is an obstacle. Under
Article 59, the party seeking suspension of the prescription of nonuse must
have a legal right to explore the land. Additionally, under Article 59,
suspension of prescription of nonuse is only applicable where the act or
event qualifying as an obstacle relates to a mineral servitude. 58 Suspension

57. Id.
58. See La. R.S. 31:59 (2000).
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of prescription of nonuse may apply to other mineral rights 59, but the
application under Article 59 is primarily pertinent to mineral servitudes.
Implicit in the designation as a mineral servitude owner is the right to
explore and produce the land’s minerals. 60
Each controversy examined relates directly, at its conception, to whether
the claimant has a right to explore the land at issue. One of the clearest
examples of a successful claim that an act was an obstacle sufficient to
suspend prescription of nonuse was the landowner’s physical act to refuse
entry to the land by the party bringing the claim before the court in Hall v.
Dixon.61 The fact that plaintiffs were the owners of mineral servitudes on
the land was undisputed.62 The plaintiffs sought “to enforce their rights as
co-owners to explore for and produce minerals” for the land at issue. 63 As
such, the initial threshold was surpassed in Hall. Likewise, in each other
case where a dispute arose around whether the claim was an obstacle under
Article 59, it was clear that the party bringing the claim for redress was the
owner of the right to explore upon the land at the time contested. 64
It is unambiguous from the jurisprudence that the right to explore the
underlying minerals from the land is the initial threshold for determining
whether an obstacle can suspend the running of prescription of nonuse. If
the right to explore the land to reduce its minerals to possession exists, then
prescription of nonuse may be suspended by an act or event falling within
the confines of Article 59.

59. While the prescription of nonuse under Article 59 relates specifically to the Mineral
Servitude, the statutory provisions for Executive Rights and Mineral Royalties infer that the
same standard proposed for an “obstacle” would be applicable to these Mineral Rights. See
e.g., La. R.S. 31:107 (2000) (permitting suspension of prescription of nonuse relating to the
Executive Right); see also e.g., La. R.S. 31:98 (2000) (permitting suspension of prescription
of nonuse relating to the Mineral Royalty).
60. La. R.S. 31:21 (2000).
61. See Hall v. Dixon, 401 So.2d 473 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1981).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 474.
64. See e.g., Corley v. Craft, 501 So. 2d 1049, 1050 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1987) (It was
undisputed on appeal that Mrs. Corley was the underlying mineral servitude owner, having
reserved the right to explore from the land in a contract of sale to Mr. Craft); see also e.g.,
Central Pines Land Co. v. U.S., 274 F. 3d 881 (5th Cir. 2001) (“In 1929 Gulf Lumber
Company conveyed to S.H. Fullerton mineral rights . . . [that] created a mineral servitude
which was eventually transferred to Wm. T. Burton Industries (Burton)” and those rights
were later transferred to Plaintiff, Central Pines Land Co., currently claiming that an obstacle
existed that suspended prescription of nonuse.).
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B. An Obstacle May Arise Because the Surface Owner Impermissibly
Restricted the Mineral Servitude Owner(S) Right to Explore the Land or an
Obstacle May Exist Wholly Apart From the Actions of the Surface Owner
Two preeminent examples of a clear man-made obstacle to the exercise
of the right to explore from the land are the circumstances in Corley and
Hall.65 The most prevalent example of a surface owner impermissibly
restricting the mineral servitude owner’s right to explore the land by his
physical doing was in Hall v. Dixon. The partial property owner pulled up
the stake marking the site of the proposed well, locked the gate which
controlled access to the proposed well site, and refused to permit the
mineral servitude owner’s contractor to enter the land to prepare for drilling
operations.66 The court found that the property owner had effectively
created an obstacle to the use of the mineral servitude. 67
Similarly, in Corley, the court determined that the continuous chain of
events directly attributable to the landowner-defendant was an obstacle. 68
An obstacle was established because the landowner refused to grant a
pipeline right-of-way to the mineral servitude owner, removed the only
access road to the property, blocked the entranceway to the drilling rig,
required that the plaintiffs fly to Baton Rouge to obtain a newly signed
drilling permit, and reported his illicit actions on the land to the Department
of Environmental Quality (the “DEQ”) to obtain an injunction on drilling
on the land. 69 It is thus clear that a physical act by a natural person that
impedes the mineral servitude owner’s ability to reasonably access the land
to explore thereon is an obstacle under Article 59.
However, the court in Hall opined “that an obstacle may exist wholly
apart from the actions of the surface owners.70 This reasonably infers that
an obstacle can occur independently of the actions of a natural or juridical
person. It has been theorized, without any substantial argument in support
of the said theory, that flooding could establish an obstacle to the exercise
of a servitude. 71 It follows from dicta in Hall and scholarship just
mentioned, as well as industry practice, that catastrophic flooding is an
65. Corley, 501 So.2d at 1049; Hall, 401 So.2d at 473.
66. Hall, 401 So.2d at 473.
67. Id. at 476.
68. Corley, 501 So.2d at 1053.
69. Id. at 1052.
70. Hall, 401 So. 2d at 476-477; Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes,
61 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 1163 (1987).
71. Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1097,
1163 (1987).
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obstacle suspending the running of prescription of nonuse relating to a
mineral servitude owner.72
Safety concerns for the crew responsible for the drilling of the well, as
well as for those citizens neighboring the property wherein the well sits,
strengthen the position that an obstacle to its use exists during inclement
weather by way of customary practices as well as the effect of government
regulation. FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program guidance notably
provides that an operator of a drilling site located in a floodplain should
always have an emergency action plan if an “imminent flood event” should
occur.73 This plan should set out how the operator will evacuate all vehicles
and movable equipment out of the area in the event of a flood. 74Anadarko, a
market leader, takes advanced action in the face of imminent flooding. 75
During the 2013 flooding, Anadarko disclosed that it had” “shut in about
670 of its 5,800 wells and about 20 miles of its more than 3,200-mile
pipeline” in Colorado.76 Failure to take such advance action may lead to a
scenario where flooding causes oil to be flushed out of wells and into
neighboring waterways. For example, the “recent Texas floods have
inundated oil wells and fracking sites, flushing oil and fracking chemicals
into rivers.”77
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as the Clean
Water Act (the “CWA”), as amended, is designed “to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's surface
waters.”78 The primary federal policy enumerated by the CWA is the
prevention of “discharges of oil or hazardous substances into or upon the
72. While this Comment primarily focuses on the application of the proposed standard
to a catastrophic flooding event, the author finds a reasonable basis to conclude that other
naturally occurring force majeure events (e.g., hurricanes or tropical storms) may rise to the
level of an obstacle depending on the event’s impact on a particular mineral servitude and
the land accompanying said mineral right.
73. Interim Technical Guidance on Drilling Oil and Gas Wells in Special Flood Hazard
Areas (SFHA), FEMA NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM, https://agriculture.
ks.gov/docs/default-source/floodplain-assorted-publications/interim-fema-oil-gasguidance.pdf?sfvrsn=cb5bf5e4_2.
74. Id.
75. Renee Lewis, Flooding Oil and Gas Wells Spark Fears of Contamination in
Colorado, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Sept. 18, 2013) http://america.aljazeera.com/
articles/2013/9/15/report-rupturedpipelinegasleaksoilspillsincoloradofloods.html.
76. Id.
77. Flooding Flushes Oil, Fracking Chemicals Into Rivers, STATESMAN (Sept. 3,
2016) https://www.statesman.com/news/20160903/flooding-flushes-oil-fracking-chemicalsinto-texas-rivers.
78. Federal Water Pollution Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §1251 (2018).
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navigable waters of the United States, adjoining shorelines, or into or upon
the waters of the contiguous zone . . . .” Penalties for violating the CWA
prohibition on water pollution include Class I penalties, which include fines
of $10,000.00 per violation, with a total cap of $25,000.00, as well as Class
II penalties that may not exceed $10,000.00 per day and are capped at
$125,000.00.79 Moreover, acts of gross negligence or willful misconduct
can subject the party to an additional civil penalty of not less than
$100,000.00, and not more than $3,000.00 per barrel of oil discharged into
the water.80
Additionally, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (the “OPA”) projects liability
onto a responsible party for an oil spill. 81 The responsible party may be
liable for removal costs and significant damages. 8280 However, the OPA
grants liability limits to responsible parties not found to have engaged in
gross negligence or willful misconduct for damage. 83 An offshore facility is
capped at $75 million and, both an Onshore Facility and a Deepwater Port
are capped at $350 million for damages from an oil spill. 84 While the Oil
Spill Liability Trust Fund may provide some relief for removal costs, the
potentially steep penalty existing for damages related to a spill has and will
continue to serve as a significant deterrent to oil and gas operators in the
event of inclement weather.85
Accordingly, the laws of the United States, as well as regulatory
guidance enacted under federal statutes, significantly deter an oil and gas
operator from exploring during catastrophic flooding. The statutory and
regulatory schemes focus on calculable penalties but do not begin to discuss
reputational costs arising as a result of contamination of the water used by
the nearby human populations. These reputational costs could irreversibly
devastate a company’s bottom line. The risk and fear of substantial
damages, as well as the safety of the operator’s crew and equipment,
establish industry practice that oil and gas activities should halt during
flooding that touches the land at issue. As a result, a reasonably prudent
operator would not exercise its right to explore, so an obstacle exists in the
same manner as if a natural person had physically restricted access to the
land. These factors support the theory elucidated by a notable scholar that
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2018).
Id. § 2702. (2018).
Id.
Id.
Oil Pollution Act § 2702.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol6/iss4/4

2021]

The Obstacle: A Proposal for a Universal Standard

619

flooding would constitute an obstacle to the exercise of a mineral
servitude.86
C. The Mineral Servitude Owner Must Be Incapable of Reasonably
Resolving the Obstruction
It is universally accepted that the mineral servitude owner must be
without any legal means to remedy the obstacle that prevents them from
exploring the land to reduce its minerals to possession. This situation
applies primarily to circumstances where a physical obstruction to use is
present, such as the landowner effectively blocking the access to, or the
actual use of, the land at issue. As in Corley and Hall, the plaintiffs “could
not have removed or prevented this continuous series of obstacles” 87 by any
legal way other than by the suit which they instituted. 88
A reasonableness standard can be inferred from the jurisprudence and
statutory provisions relating to the requirement that the party seeking relief
must be incapable of remedying the obstacle. As such, the mineral servitude
owner must have acted as a reasonably prudent mineral servitude owner
would have under similar circumstances. This derives from the standard for
a co-owner of a mineral servitude with its other co-owner,89 as well as a
mineral lessee in its relation to a mineral lessor. 90 Therefore, if the plaintiff
has confirmed that they owned the right to explore the land and an obstacle
within the scope of Article 59 existed, then they must have been incapable
of resolving the obstacle by legal means that a reasonably prudent mineral
servitude owner would have conducted.
A traditional obstacle dilemma involves an obstacle created by a person
(generally the landowner or their agent), as opposed to a natural event. This
circumstance puts the agitator in a poor position to argue that the mineral
86. See Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV.1097,
1163 (1987).
87. Corley v. Craft, 501 So.2d 1049, 1052 (La. 1987).
88. See id.; see also Hall v. Dixon 401 So.2d 473, 476 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987).
89. La. R.S. 31:176 (2000) (The provision notes that “[a] co-owner . . . must act at all
times in good faith and as a reasonably prudent mineral servitude owner whose interest is
not subject to co-ownership.” However, there is ambiguity whether the co-owner can
stipulate what conduct is contained in this reasonableness standard. As Louisiana Mineral
Code Article 122 explicitly provides for a right to stipulate on the reasonableness standard,
this provision does not do so.)
90. La. R.S. 31:122 (2000) (“A mineral lessee . . . is bound to perform the contract in
good faith and to develop and operate the property leased as a reasonably prudent operator
for the mutual benefit of himself and his lessor. Parties may stipulate what shall constitute
reasonably prudent conduct on the part of the lessee.”).
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servitude owner should not have waited until the last minute to drill because
the landowner’s conduct was likely unforeseeable. However, an obstacle
created by a natural, potentially foreseeable event raises a question
regarding the applicability of a duty to preemptively mitigate foreseeable
events caused by weather.
In the event that a mineral servitude owner waits until the last minute to
drill, the operator may be incapable of raising an obstacle defense because a
reasonably prudent operator may be subject to an implied duty to take
advance steps to mitigate against foreseeable threats.91 A reasonable
attempt to resolve the obstruction preemptively may be an implied duty if
flooding is anticipated to occur in the future. 92 However, this claim has not
been addressed by either the judiciary or legislature in Louisiana in the
context of an obstacle affecting the exercise of a Mineral Servitude.
Foreseeability is a prevalent topic in the ambit of tort law but could have
application in this setting.93 The Supreme Court of the United States has
proclaimed that floods are not foreseeable in the context of a force majeure
clause. 94 However, not every flood would be an excuse for delays, such as
when the obstacles were anticipated by a contractor in his estimate of time
and cost.95 If an obstacle is foreseeable based on scientific data touching the
particular area at issue, then it is an open argument on whether the force
majeure doctrine should be extended to the mineral rights owner to impose
a mandate to prepare land for a natural event. 96 To mitigate this uncertainty,
the landowner, seeking to protect itself from loss, would effectively be
under a duty to take preemptive steps to mold the property in preparation of
foreseeable inclement weather. But, a duty to take preemptive steps should
never be imposed in the event of unforeseeable weather that restricts the
ability to explore the land.
The ecologically rich Louisiana wetlands have been privy to thousands
of exploration and development wells dating back to 1937.97 Drilling in the
91. See id.
92. This paper does not set out to establish whether a particular duty to preemptively act
exists in the context of an Article 59 obstruction claim, but instead raises the possibility that
it may exist.
93. See W J. Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C.L. REV. 921 (2005).
94. United States v. Brooks-Callaway Co., 318 U.S. 120 (1943).
95. See id.
96. FEMA’s flood maps could provide the appropriate scientific data to put an operator
on notice that preemptive steps should be taken to address a flood-prone tract of land. See
FEMA Flood Map Service Center, https://msc.fema.gov/portal/home.
97. Donald W. Davis and John L. Place, The Oil and Gas Industry of Coastal Louisiana
and its Effect on Land Use and Socioeconomic Patterns, United States Department of the
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Louisiana wetlands has recently become extremely controversial, with local
governments seeking redress from energy companies under the theory that
drilling has significantly damaged the wetlands, making the neighboring
land more prone to storm damage.98 Besides the controversy, drilling in and
around the Louisiana wetlands provides a quintessential example of why a
duty to mitigate foreseeable flooding should be imposed on operators
seeking the protection of Article 59.
Floodplain wetlands are naturally designed to store flood waters during
high runoff events.99 Louisiana wetlands are primarily privately-owned,
making it very economic to explore for minerals. 100 The wetlands are
entirely within the lowest-lying area of the State, making it immensely
flood prone.101 Moreover, the Louisiana coastline is often threatened by
winter storms and hurricanes, which bring with them the indomitable force
of storm surge. 102 Thus, it is extremely predictable that land in or near the
marshlands of Louisiana will face impact by flood waters that cause
operators to temporarily suspend their actions until the water subsides. 103
Interior Geological Survey, https://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1983/0118/report.pdf (“Onshore, more
than 6,300 exploratory wells and more than 21,000 development wells were drilled in
Louisiana*s eight southernmost parishes between 1937 and 1977. Nearly all those wells
were in wetlands or inland water bodies.”).
98. Chris Kardish, Southern Louisiana Picks a Fight with Big Oil to Save the Wetlands,
GOVERNING (Aug. 25, 2015) https://www.governing.com/topics/transportationinfrastructure/gov-louisiana-wetlands-lawsuits.html; Mark Schleifstein, New Orleans Files
Wetland Damage Suit Against Oil, Gas Companies, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr.1, 2019,
https://www.nola.com/news/environment/article_601e0eaf-c33b-53c1-88726887c3c5cd90.html.
99. Agency of Natural Resources Department of Environmental Conservation, Wetland
Functions and Values: Water Storage for Flood Water and Storm Runoff | Department of
Environmental Conservation. https://dec.vermont.gov/watershed/wetlands/functions/storage
[Accessed 4 Dec. 2019].
100. Sara Sneath, As Louisiana’s Coast Washes Away, State Cashing in on Disputed Oil
and Gas Rights, THE TIMES PICAYUNE (May 31, 2018) https://www.nola.com/news/
environment/article_9894c6d7-794c-5ef6-a21e 120ff729527c.html.
101. John J. Kosovich, State of Louisiana—Highlight Low-Lying Area Derived from
USGS Digital Elevation Data, Nov. 2008, UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
available at https://pubs.usgs.gov/sim/3049
102. Edward Richards, Why the Master Plan Will Not Protect Louisiana and What We
Should Do Instead, LSU LAW CENTER: CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY
PROJECT, (February 21, 2017) https://sites.law.lsu.edu/coast/2017/02/why the-master-planwill-not-protect-the-coast-and-what-we-should-do-instead/.
103. David E. Dismukes and Siddhartha Narra, Sea-Level Rise and Coastal Inundation:
A Case Study of the Gulf Coast Energy Infrastructure, Natural Resources, 9, 150-174,
https://doi.org/10.4236/nr.2018.94010. (“Many coastal communities have to deal with more

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

622

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 6

As such, this component of the land must be factored into the calculus of
drilling operations and an operator should have a duty to take reasonable
steps to mitigate the force of the foreseeable flooding. Absent these
proactive steps being taken, a mineral servitude owner should be prevented
from claiming that inundation of their land established an obstacle to its
use.
Similarly, operations occurring within a 10, 25, 50, or 100-year flood
zone may also be subject to the proposed implied duty to preemptively
mitigate foreseeable events. A 100-year flood zone generally has a 1%
annual chance of flooding.104 A 10-year flood zone has a 10% yearly
chance of flooding, while 25 and 50-year flood zones have a 4% and 2%
annual chance of flooding, respectively. 105 These areas are coined “High
Risk Areas” by FEMA.106 Over ten years, a mineral servitude owner must
“use” the property. Respectively, there is a vastly increased risk of flooding
occurring within these particular flood zones. Respectively, the risk of
flooding over a ten years rises to 65%, 34%, 18%, and 10%.107 At a
minimum, an operator within a 10 and 25- year flood zone seeking the
protection of Article 59 should be under a duty to take preemptive steps to
mitigate, as the risk is foreseeable. 108 While not as persuasive, an operator
under a 50 and 100-year flood zone should likewise be subject to the
requirement of taking advance preparatory steps. 109
In sum, when the mineral servitude owner has a legal right to explore the
land,110 is restricted from exploration due to the actions of the landowner(s)
or some other event,111 and is subsequently incapable of reasonably curing
that restriction, then an obstacle to the exercise of the mineral servitude
frequent and extended flooding in the next few decades even before the rising sea levels lead
to greater inundation extent.”).
104. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Definitions of FEMA Flood Zone
Designations, available at https://efotg.sc.egov.usda.gov/references/public/NM/FEMA_
FLD_HAZ_guide.pdf.
105. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Unit 3: NFIP Flood Studies and Maps
(2015), available at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/floodplain/nfip_sg_unit_3.pdf.
106. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Definitions of FEMA Flood Zone
Designations, available at https://efotg.sc.egov.usda.gov/references/public/NM/FEMA_
FLD_HAZ_guide.pdf.
107. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Unit 3: NFIP Flood Studies and Maps
(2015), available at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/floodplain/nfip_sg_unit_3.pdf.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See infra Part III.A.
111. See infra Part III.B.
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exists, and the tolling of prescription of nonuse is suspended until the
obstacle’s removal.
IV. Application Of Standard Demonstrates Definitely That Catastrophic
Flooding Is An Obstacle Sufficient To Suspend Prescription
Absent a grant of judicial relief under to Article 59, Boudreaux’s failure
to sufficiently exercise his mineral rights by January 1, 2019, would result
in the termination of his mineral servitude and the subsequent reversion of
the rights to the owner of the land—Thibodeaux. Thus, Thibodeaux would
be entitled to the profits gained by Boudreaux during the time he
improperly extracted minerals from Blackacre. 112
However, the proposed standard for determining whether particular
actions or events are sufficient to rise to the level of an obstacle under the
Louisiana Mineral Code grants a more equitable result than a strict
application of the current ambiguous “standard” and opens the door for
outside natural forces to represent an obstacle. When the mineral servitude
owner, such as Boudreaux, has a legal right to explore the land, 113 is
restricted from exploring the land due to the actions of the landowner(s) or
some other event, 114 and is subsequently incapable of curing that restriction
by reasonable and legal means, then an obstacle to the exercise of the
mineral servitude exists, and the tolling of prescription of nonuse is
suspended until the obstacle’s removal from the land.
Boudreaux has a legal right to explore the land by way of the mineral
servitude agreement executed between Boudreaux and Thibodeaux upon
the sale of Blackacre to Thibodeaux and the concurrent reservation of the
right to explore for minerals upon the land. 115 The controversial analysis
arises in the context of whether there was a natural, non-manmade obstacle
and, if true, whether that obstacle was preventable by Boudreaux.
Flooding constitutes an obstacle to the exercise of a mineral servitude. 116
Various federal laws and regulatory schemes support this position because
the legislatures and administrative agencies significantly deter an oil and

112. See La. R.S. 31:12 (2000) (“Except as provided in Article 14, the owner of land may
protect his rights in minerals against trespass, damage, and other wrongful acts of
interference by all means available for the protection of ownership.”).
113. See infra Part III.A.
114. See infra Part III.B.
115. See infra Introduction.
116. See Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV.1097,
1163 (1987).
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gas operator exploration during catastrophic flooding. 117 Also, reputational
costs due to contamination of the water used by the nearby human
populations could irreversibly devastate a company’s bottom line, so the
operator is also deterred from acting under this clear rationale. 118
Additionally, the safety of the operator’s crew and equipment, in
connection with other factors, establishes industry practice that oil and gas
activities should halt during flooding that touches the land at issue. 119 As a
result, a reasonably prudent operator would not exercise its right to explore,
so an obstacle exists in the same manner as if a natural person had
physically restricted land access. 120
It follows that the running of prescription of nonuse on Blackacre was
suspended during the time concerning the flood. Given that floodwaters are
generally incapable of control, absent a substantial investment by
government entities, Boudreaux is incapable of curing that restriction by
reasonable and legal means. Accordingly, under the facts presented,
prescription of nonuse would be suspended on January 29, 2009 and
Boudreaux would have two additional days after the obstacle was removed
from the land to interrupt prescription of nonuse by beginning good faith
drilling. Since drilling was conducted to the depth where paying quantities
are located within 2 days of the obstacle ceasing to be a barrier to
operations, Boudreaux retains the right to explore for minerals on
Blackacre. Alas, he is a millionaire, and Clotile is a happy wife.
Mineral Rights Do Not Flood Away
The civilian abrogation of the ad coelum doctrine, effectively eliminating
the absolute ownership of land, has created a predicament warranting
reparation. Mineral Servitude owners should rely on a concrete set of
standards when determining whether a particular act or event is substantial
enough to interrupt prescription of nonuse. The courts have been mostly
silent on flooding and its effect on the right to explore for minerals. As
flooding concerns continue to grow, the courts should adopt a set of
standards to prevent immense controversy from arising between the mineral
servitude owner and the landowner seeking to claim that the right to explore
has terminated because of nonuse prescription. Under the proposed
standard, the mineral servitude owner’s rights would not flood away.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See infra Part III.B.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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